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Past research has suggested that familiarity with a message, brought about by rep-
etition, can increase (Cacioppo & Petty, 1989) or decrease (Garcia–Marques &
Mackie, 2001) analytic (systematic) processing of that message. Two experiments
attempted to resolve these contradictory findings by examining how personal rel-
evance may moderate the impact of familiarity on processing. Experiment 1 ma-
nipulated repetition and personal relevance and found that message repetition
increased analytic processing (as reflected by greater persuasion following strong
vs. weak arguments) under high relevance conditions and decreased analytic pro-
cessing when relevance was low. In Experiment 2, both repetition and relevance
were manipulated in different ways, but results again showed that repetition re-
duced analytic processing under low relevance conditions and that perceived fa-
miliarity mediated this outcome. Implications of these findings are discussed.
Three times in the same hour, a television commercial commands us to
“tune in for ‘Friends’ on Thursday at 8 pm.” Similar debates on two dif-
Social Cognition, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2004, pp. 310-335
310
This work was supported by grant SBR–9209995 from the National Science Foundation.
The authors wish to thank our undergraduate research assistants, Matthew Hirsch and
Kristin Davis, for their help with data collection.
Address correspondence to Heather Claypool, Department of Psychology, 136 Benton
Hall, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056; E–mail: claypohm@muohio.edu.
ferent news programs argue about when the economy will recover. And
during the period of a few weeks at the height of campaign season, we
hear over and over why one candidate deserves our vote more than an-
other. As these examples illustrate, persuasive messages (like most other
types of information) are often repeated and are in some manner famil-
iar to us. Does this suggest that familiar messages are more effective at
persuading us? And what impact does familiarity have on the process-
ing of persuasive messages? Is a repeated (familiar) message processed
more or less carefully than one that is not repeated? The research to date
has yielded conflicting answers to these questions.
FAMILIARITY AND ANALYTIC PROCESSING
Cacioppo and Petty (1989) hypothesized and demonstrated that re-
peated persuasive messages were processed more analytically than
those that were not repeated. Participants were asked to evaluate the
sound quality of a message to be broadcast to the university community.
The message was an appeal by a fictitious faculty committee stating that
all seniors be required to pass a comprehensive exam in their major area
of study prior to graduation. Repetition of both strong and weak ver-
sions of the message was varied by presenting the message either one or
three times in succession. Cacioppo and Petty found that attitudes about
comprehensive exams were only marginally more favorable in response
to strong compared to weak arguments when the message was heard
only once. However, when the message was repeated, attitudes were
significantly more favorable following strong versus weak arguments.
Having more favorable attitudes following strong compared to weak ar-
guments is widely accepted as an indication of analytic processing,
whereas having equivalent attitudes in response to strong and weak ar-
guments indicates less of such processing, or what we term nonanalytic
processing (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Therefore, Cacioppo and
Petty’s (1989) results supported their prediction that moderate repeti-
tion increases analytic processing. They believed this occurred because
repeated exposures to a message afford additional opportunities for
message elaboration. In essence, message repetition increases one’s
ability to attain “greater realization of the meaning, interconnections,
and implications of the message arguments” (p. 4).
This interpretation is consistent with findings from earlier work
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1979, Experiment 2) in which participants heard a
pro– or counterattitudinal message one or three times, rated their agree-
ment with the message, and listed their thoughts in reaction to the advo-
cacy. Results showed that as message exposure increased from one to
three times, agreement with the message also increased and the number
of counterarguments to the message decreased. These results supported
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the notion that moderate repetition of the arguments “provided more
opportunities to elaborate cognitively upon them and to realize their co-
gency and favorable implications” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979, p. 105).
FAMILIARITY AND NONANALYTIC PROCESSING
In contrast to these findings, Garcia–Marques and Mackie (2001) demon-
strated that repeated persuasive messages are processed less analytically
than those that are not. In the first of two experiments, participants were
presented with a message that opposed the implementation of govern-
mentally enforced controls on American industry to minimize the effects of
acid rain on the Northeastern states. Familiarity was varied by the number
of times (one, two, three, or five) the message was presented. When the
message was heard only once, participants were more persuaded by strong
than weak arguments, indicating analytic processing; however, if the mes-
sage had been repeated at all, participants were equally persuaded by
strong and weak arguments, indicating nonanalytic processing.
A second experiment that used a more subtle manipulation of repeti-
tion replicated these findings. Instead of repeating the message succes-
sively, two messages were presented simultaneously. The participant
was instructed to concentrate on a written message (presented on the
computer screen) arguing the benefits of commercial weight loss cen-
ters, while the acid rain target message was played as background noise
(in the repetition condition) or was not played at all (in the no–repetition
condition). Later, all participants read the acid rain message. As in the
first experiment, participants in the repetition condition showed no dif-
ferentiation between strong and weak arguments, whereas those in the
no–repetition condition did, suggesting that familiarity leads to
nonanalytic processing.
As an explanation for these results, Garcia–Marques and Mackie
(2001) drew heavily from theory and research in cognitive psychology.
For example, mismatch theory (Johnston & Hawley, 1994) argues that
intense cognitive effort directed at the processing of frequently encoun-
tered (familiar) stimuli squanders limited resources that could be de-
voted to new, unfamiliar stimuli. When a perceived stimulus context
matches a memory trace, the initial bottom–up processing of that stimu-
lus proceeds in an easy and fluid manner, which results in a sense of fa-
miliarity (e.g., Eich, 1982). The phenomenological sense of fluency,
brought about by familiarity, signals that nonanalytic processing can
safely be used. This allows one’s limited resources to be used elsewhere.
Research in a variety of areas of cognitive psychology supports this
view. For example, Reder and Ritter (1992) used a paradigm in which
participants decided to retrieve or compute answers to math problems
under time pressure. They found evidence that familiarity with the
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kinds of problems sparked a “feeling of knowing” the answer and deci-
sions to use relatively effortless retrieval strategies. Less familiar prob-
lems led to decisions to use more effortful computational strategies.
When participants had practiced particular types of problems and were
later presented with similar (but novel) problems, they incorrectly opted
to retrieve rather than compute the answers. Research on expertise also
offers supporting evidence. Experts are individuals who have a great
deal of experience (i.e., familiarity) with a particular area. When pre-
sented with information relevant to their area of expertise, they tend to
rely on “top–down,” relatively effortless processing strategies, whereas
nonexperts do the opposite (Arkes & Freedman, 1984; Chase & Simon,
1973; Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993).
PERSONAL RELEVANCE AS A RESOLUTION?
Thus, repetition has been shown to both increase (Cacioppo & Petty,
1989) and decrease (Garcia–Marques & Mackie, 2001) analytic process-
ing. Detailed examination of these two sets of research reveals a number
of methodological differences that could potentially account for the con-
flicting results. Among all these differences, one seems particularly
important—personal relevance.
Participants in Cacioppo and Petty’s (1989) study may well have expe-
rienced a relatively high level of personal relevance. The target issue in
that study focused on the institution of senior comprehensive exams, an
issue of undoubtedly high relevance to most undergraduate partici-
pants. In addition, the message was allegedly written by a faculty com-
mittee for broadcast to the university community, further legitimizing
its seriousness, importance, and potential personal impact. This level of
personal relevance may have inspired substantial elaboration on the
part of Cacioppo and Petty’s participants when they were given the op-
portunity for further processing. This is important because Cacioppo
and Petty (1989) suggested that moderate repetition would only in-
crease processing of a persuasive message when one is “motivated to
think about the advocacy” (p. 4). On the other hand, the target message
used by Garcia–Marques and Mackie (2001) concerned imposing gov-
ernmental regulations on businesses to control acid rain. This message
was not particularly involving for the participants, whose pretest rat-
ings of involvement were only at the scale midpoint. Thus, Cacioppo
and Petty (1989) may have found an increase in analytic processing with
repetition because participants found the issue highly relevant, and
Garcia–Marques and Mackie (2001) may have found the opposite
pattern because participants dealt with a less personally involving issue.
Why might differences in personal relevance influence how message
repetition affects processing? When personal relevance is high, partici-
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pants typically process information carefully, and their attitudes are typi-
cally more influenced by the content of the arguments presented in the
advocacy. Peripheral cues have relatively less impact on attitudinal out-
comes. When relevance is low, the opposite is true. For example, Petty,
Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) had participants listen to a persuasive
message containing strong or weak arguments advocating the implemen-
tation of senior comprehensive exams at their university in the near future
(high relevance) or in 10 years (low relevance). In addition, they manipu-
lated whether the source was prestigious (Princeton professor) or not (a
high school student). When the message was of high personal relevance,
participants were more persuaded by strong than weak arguments, and
source expertise (the peripheral cue) had no impact on their attitudes.
However, when the message was of little personal relevance, source
expertise had a greater impact on attitudes than the strength of the
arguments.
In general, when personal relevance is influenced by a manipulation that
affects a respondent’s ability to achieve important goals (e.g., to graduate
from college, as in Petty et al., 1981), its impact on persuasive processing de-
pends on argument quality. In their meta–analysis examining the role of in-
volvement on persuasion, Johnson and Eagly (1989) showed that
“outcome–relevant involvement” interacts with argument quality across
several studies, such that those in high involvement conditions were more
persuaded by strong and less persuaded by weak arguments than those in
low involvement conditions. Results of studies such as those of Petty et al.
(1981) and the meta–analytic findings of Johnson and Eagly (1989) suggest
that high (outcome) relevance conditions typically result in analytic pro-
cessing, whereas low relevance conditions result in nonanalytic processing.
If familiarity triggers nonanalytic processing, as suggested by Gar-
cia–Marques and Mackie (2001), mismatch theory (Johnston & Hawley,
1994) and supporting research in cognitive psychology (e.g., Reder &
Ritter, 1992), then its ultimate impact on persuasive processing may well
be influenced by relevance. Chaiken (1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly,
1989) has argued that “systematic” (analytic) and less effortful process-
ing can co–occur, leading to additive and interactive effects on attitudes.
Furthermore, Chaiken has argued that nonanalytic processing occurs
relatively (if not entirely) automatically, whereas analytic processing
only occurs with sufficient cognitive ability and motivation. Therefore,
if familiarity triggers nonanalytic processing, and relevance and thus
motivation are low, no further processing may occur. When motivation
and relevance are high, however, the nonanalytic processing triggered
by familiarity may be complemented by the analytic processing trig-
gered by increased motivation. Although both nonanalytic and analytic
processing can co–occur in high relevance conditions, analytic process-
ing likely “attenuate[s] the judgmental impact of [nonanalytic] process-
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ing” because it “typical ly provides people with more
judgment–relevant information than [nonanalytic] processing” (Eagly
& Chaiken, 1993, p. 328). In other words, the nonanalytic processing
triggered by familiarity may be overwhelmed in these circumstances
because increased motivation leads to additional message scrutiny.
OVERVIEW AND PREDICTIONS
The goal of this research was to determine whether personal relevance
moderates the impact of familiarity on persuasive–message processing,
thus allowing a reconciliation of the contradictory findings in the litera-
ture. Cacioppo and Petty (1989) argued that message repetition would
increase analytic processing (as indicated by an increasing divergence in
persuasion following strong compared to weak arguments), assuming
of course that message recipients had the motivation and capacity to
process. In the first study, we replicated Cacioppo and Petty’s (1989)
method as closely as possible, while adding a parallel condition in which
participants whose motivation was lower were also afforded the extra
opportunity to process a message via repetition.
We predicted that the impact of message repetition on processing
would depend on relevance. When relevance was low, we expected a re-
peated message to be processed less analytically than a nonrepeated
one. In contrast, when relevance was high, we expected that the repeated
message would receive more analytic processing than the nonrepeated
one. As is typical, analytic processing was inferred from greater attitude




Ninety–one (32 male and 59 female) University of California, Santa
Barbara (UCSB) students received class credit for participation. Six se-
niors were excluded because their senior status nullified the relevance
manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight dif-
ferent conditions representing a 2 (argument strength: weak vs. strong)
× 2 (relevance: low vs. high) × 2 (repetition: repetition vs. no–repetition)
between–subjects factorial design.
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Procedure
Instructions and Assessment of Initial Attitudes. Participants were led to
believe that the experiment concerned the evaluation of the quality of a
tape recording. Participants were seated individually in separate booths,
where IBM PCs presented all instructions and experimental materials.
With the alleged purpose of collecting “control variables,” we asked
participants to report their gender, class, and hearing ability, as well as a
number of attitudes on current topics. The key item addressed attitudes
about comprehensive exams (There should be a system of campus–wide com-
prehensive examinations as a requirement for graduation from UCSB). Agree-
ment with this statement was assessed using a 9–point scale with the
endpoints “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree.”
Manipulation of Relevance. Next, participants read a paragraph ex-
plaining the origin of the tape–recorded message and the reason its eval-
uation was needed by the Psychology Department. In the high relevance
condition (based on Cacioppo & Petty, 1989), participants were told:
The Psychology Department was asked to develop a study to evaluate
the sound quality of an audiotaped message concerning an issue that is
currently under consideration for change at UCSB. This audiotaped
message was prepared by a faculty committee for possible broadcast in
the university community. We are asking a small group of participants
like yourselves to rate some of the tape’s features for us.
In the low relevance condition, participants were told:
The Psychology Department was asked to provide feedback about the
sound quality of an audiotaped message. This audiotaped message was
prepared by local high school students for possible use in a required
psychology experiment. We are asking a group of participants like
yourselves to rate some of the tape’s features for us.
Manipulation of Repetition. Those in the no–repetition condition were
then told that they would listen to the recording one time and then be
asked to rate the tape’s quality. They were then directed to put on the
provided headphones,1 press the play button of the cassette player, and
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1. One earpiece of the headphones was marked with a red dot. This earpiece was the “ac-
tive channel” through which the message could be heard. Right–handed participants were
instructed to put the earpiece with the red dot on their left ear, and left–handed partici-
pants were to put the marked earpiece on their right ear. This controlled for any impact of
lateral organization on persuasiveness. Presentation of a persuasive message to the left ce-
rebral hemisphere of right–handers appears to increase resistance to the message, whereas
presentation to the right hemisphere decreases resistance (and vice versa for left–handers;
Drake, 1991; Drake & Bingham, 1985).
listen closely to the message until they heard a “beep,” which signaled
that they should press the “stop” button of the cassette player.
Those in the repetition condition were told that they would be listen-
ing to the recording three times before being asked to rate the tape’s
quality because in the media broadcast (high relevance) or high school
experiment (low relevance) individuals might be exposed to the mes-
sage multiple times.2 After they pressed the play button, they heard the
same message three times, with approximately 2 seconds of silence
between each presentation.
Manipulation of Argument Strength. Participants heard either a strong
or a weak version of a message promoting the implementation of com-
prehensive exams.
Dependent Measures. We asked participants one item (as did Cacioppo
& Petty, 1989) assessing their attitude about senior comprehensive exams
(UCSB should introduce comprehensive exams as an academic policy). Partici-
pants were told that this was necessary “in order to control for possible at-
titudinal influences on the evaluation of the quality of the tape.”
We next asked participants three questions reported in Cacioppo and
Petty (1989), one about the tape’s quality (In my opinion, the sound quality
of the audiotape is Very poor 1 …9 Very good) and two about the processing
task (How distracted did you feel while listening to the audiotape? Not at all 1 …
9 Very Much; How much mental effort did you expend thinking about the con-
tent of the message presented on the audiotape? None 1… 9 Very Much).
Participants were then asked two questions to assess the effectiveness of
the relevance manipulation (The issue discussed in the audiotaped message is
personally important to me; I was highly motivated to pay close attention to the is-
sue presented in the audiotaped message), two questions assessing how strong
and convincing the arguments were, and one item assessing how tired they
felt. At this point, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
RESULTS
Initial analysis confirmed that the pro-comprehensive exam message
was counterattitudinal (initial attitude M = 2.64, on a 9–point scale).
Checks on the Effectiveness of Manipulations
Relevance. The two items assessing personal relevance and motivation
were averaged (α = .76). This index was subjected to a 2 (argument
CLAYPOOL ET AL. 317
2. We wished to follow Cacioppo and Petty’s (1989) methodology as closely as possible.
They forewarned participants about whether they would hear the message once or multi-
ple times, so we did also.
strength) × 2 (repetition) × 2 (relevance) between–subjects ANOVA. As
expected, this analysis yielded a main effect of relevance, F(1, 77) = 4.862,
p = .03. Those in the high-relevance condition believed the message to be
more personally relevant (M = 5.67) than those in the low-relevance con-
dition (M = 4.82). No other main effects or interactions were found.
Argument Strength. The two items assessing argument strength were
averaged to form an argument strength index (α = .94). The results of the
ANOVA showed only a main effect of argument quality, F(1,77) = 32.86,
p < .001. Those who read the message containing strong arguments be-
lieved it to be more compelling (M = 6.08) than those who read the mes-
sage with the weak arguments (M = 3.82).
Attitude Change
Participants’ initial (pre-message) attitudes about senior comprehensive
exams were subtracted from the post-message attitude item to form an at-
titude–change score. This change score was subjected to a 2 (argument
strength) × 2 (repetition) × 2 (relevance) × 2 (participant sex) be-
tween–subjects ANOVA. Participant sex was included because the gen-
der composition of this sample was substantially unbalanced and
because a preliminary analysis showed a marginal sex difference on
pre-message attitudes toward senior comprehensive exams in this sam-
ple, t(83) = 1.684, p = .096; M = 2.25 (men) and M = 2.82 (women). The
analysis of change scores yielded three statistically significant results.
The first was a main effect of argument strength, F(1, 69) = 23.78, p < .001,
showing that those who heard strong arguments were persuaded more
(M = 2.55) than those who heard weak ones (M = 0.38). Secondly, there
was an interaction between argument strength and participant sex, F(1,
69) = 4.16, p = .045. This interaction revealed that the argument strength
manipulation was effective for both sexes, but stronger for men.
Most importantly, there was the predicted three–way interaction
among repetition, argument strength, and relevance, F(1, 69) = 10.50, p
= .002. We expected participants to process less analytically in the repeti-
tion condition than in the no–repetition condition when relevance was
low. This prediction was supported. A planned contrast in the low-rele-
vance condition (contrast weights: 1, –1, –1, 1) revealed a marginally sig-
nificant two–way interaction between repetition and argument
strength, F(1, 69) = 3.58, p = .06. As shown in Figure 1,3 when the message
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3. In Figure 1, it may appear that there is more analytic processing in the low–relevance,
no–repetition condition than in the high–relevance, no–repetition condition. However, a
post–hoc analysis on the no–repetition cells indicates that there is no interaction between
relevance and argument strength, F(1, 31) = 1.879, p = .180.
was heard only once, participants were more persuaded by strong com-
pared to weak arguments, suggesting analytic processing [planned con-
trast, F(1, 69) = 9.485, p = .003]. However, when the message was heard
three times, this effect disappeared [planned contrast, F(1,69) = .5776, p =
.45].
When relevance was high, we expected to find more analytic process-
ing of the message when it had been repeated, which is what we found.
When relevance was high, a planned contrast (contrast weights: 1, –1, –1,
1) revealed a significant two–way interaction between repetition and ar-
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FIGURE 1. Experiment 1: Attitude change as a function of relevance, repetition, and
argument strength.
gument strength, F(1, 69) = 10.13, p = .002. As shown in Figure 1, when
the message was heard only once, there was no difference in attitude
change between strong and weak versions of the message, indicating
nonanalytic processing [planned contrast, F(1, 69) = 1.331, p = .253].
However, when the message was heard three times, participants did dif-
ferentiate between strong and weak arguments, indicating analytic pro-
cessing [planned contrast, F(1, 69) = 30.122, p < .001]. With each
presentation of the message, participants were apparently able to attain
“greater realization of the meaning, interconnections, and implications
of the message arguments” as suggested by Cacioppo and Petty (1989, p.
4). Perhaps because the arguments were read to participants at a conver-
sational pace and not studied at a slower rate, participants could not
glean all of the implications of the arguments during the first exposure.
Thus, more and more information was taken from the message with
each presentation. This type of presentation format, therefore, may have
provided the ideal circumstance to demonstrate that repetition can
increase analytic processing when relevance is high.
Assessment of Fatigue
Because differences in the experimental demands of the task were con-
founded with repetition, we conducted a 2 (argument strength) × 2 (rep-
etition) × 2 (relevance) between–subjects ANOVA on the question
addressing feelings of tiredness to rule out fatigue as an alternative ex-
planation for our findings. Those who heard the message three times
may have experienced excessive fatigue or burnout, which could make
it difficult to process analytically. Such fatigue could offer an alternative
explanation for why we observed nonanalytic processing in the low rel-
evance condition after repetition. However, there were no main effects
or interactions on the measure assessing tiredness.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 provided initial confirmation that personal relevance
plays an important role in determining the impact of message repetition
on processing. As expected, when personal relevance was low, repeti-
tion triggered less analytic processing of the message compared to when
the message was presented only once. This happened even when partici-
pants had plenty of opportunity to process and when they knew that the
third repetition would be their last opportunity to process.
Repetition had quite a different effect in the high relevance condition.
When personal relevance was high, additional exposure to the message
increased the persuasive impact of strong relative to weak arguments.
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Thus, the results were nicely consistent with the idea that under condi-
tions of low relevance, message repetition would result in less analytic
processing than a single exposure to the message, whereas under condi-
tions of high relevance, message repetition would produce more
analytic processing than a single message exposure.
Experiment 2 was designed to provide even more compelling support
for our interactional hypothesis involving relevance, repetition, and ar-
gument strength. First, we wanted to improve the manipulation of per-
sonal relevance. The check on the effectiveness of the relevance
manipulation in Experiment 1 indicated that it was both effective and
unconfounded with other manipulated factors. Nevertheless, the fact
that it was derived from a procedure that Cacioppo and Petty (1989) as-
sumed post hoc induced high relevance meant that the manipulation
was not as precise as we would have liked. In Experiment 2, we used an
extremely well validated personal relevance manipulation to provide an
additional test of our hypotheses. We again predicted that relevance
would significantly moderate the impact of repetition on message
processing as indexed by attitude change.
Second, we wished to provide a test of our hypothesis under condi-
tions in which message repetition was much more subtle. In Experiment
1, participants explicitly knew that they would hear the message one
versus three times. Thus, in the repetition condition, they knew they
would have the opportunity to process the message further after the first
presentation. In Experiment 2, prior exposure to the message in the repe-
tition conditions was more subtle and occurred in a manner that might
have made careful processing of that first exposure difficult. All partici-
pants were then given equal and adequate opportunity to process the
target message, allowing us to compare how this kind of repetition inter-
acted with relevance to influence processing. We again predicted that
when relevance was low, the familiarity induced even by subtle repeti-
tion would reduce analytic processing of a repeated message compared
to when the message was heard only a single time. When relevance was
high, we expected analytic processing to increase with repetition. How-
ever, given the restricted processing context of initial exposure, we ex-
pected this effect might be more muted than that found in Experiment 1.
Remember, Cacioppo and Petty (1989) argue that additional exposures
to a message afford more opportunities to scrutinize the merits of the
message arguments, resulting in even greater differentiation of attitudes
following strong and weak arguments, compared to a single exposure. If
the message is not processed much at all on initial exposure (because its
presentation is so subtle), then little is gleaned from the message origi-
nally. In other words, most of the message elaboration may take place on
the second obvious exposure. So, those who were exposed to the mes-
sage previously in this study may not demonstrate much more analytic
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processing after the second (but first obvious) exposure to the message
than those presented with only one (but obvious) exposure to the
message.
Finally, we wished to provide some evidence for our claim that the
change in analytic processing following repetition is mediated by familiar-
ity. Providing evidence of mediation in this paradigm is difficult because
inferences about analytic processing are made from a between–subjects
comparison of persuasion following strong and weak arguments. Never-
theless, an argument can be made that persuasion derived from weak argu-
ments can provide an index of analytic processing. Although strong
arguments have heuristic as well as systematic features that might cause
persuasion, any attempt to carefully evaluate weak arguments regularly
and typically reduces their persuasive power. Thus, relative rejection or ac-
ceptance of weak arguments can index the relative occurrence of analytic or
nonanalytic processing. Because of the subtle nature of prior exposure in
this study as compared to Experiment 1, we expected variation in partici-
pants’ perceptions of message familiarity in this experiment. Thus, in the
low relevance conditions, where we expected repetition–induced familiar-
ity to reduce analytic processing, we expected this variation to mediate the
impact of message repetition on analytic processing as indexed by accep-
tance of weak arguments. Our expectations are not as clear in the high rele-
vance conditions. Although we expect repetition to induce greater
processing under these conditions, this effect is not necessarily mediated by
perceived familiarity of the arguments, but more probably by increases in




Seventy (39 male and 31 female) UCSB students received either money
($8–$10) or class credit for participation. Five seniors were excluded be-
cause their senior status nullified the relevance manipulation. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of eight different conditions
representing a 2 (argument strength: weak vs. strong) × 2 (personal rele-
vance: low vs. high) × 2 (repetition: repetition vs. no–repetition)
between–subjects factorial design.
Procedure
Instructions and Assessment of Initial Attitudes. Participants, in groups
of one to six per session, were told that the experiment concerned the ef-
322 EFFECTS OF RELEVANCE AND REPETITION ON PROCESSING
fects of carrying out multiple tasks at once and that all instructions
would be presented at the appropriate time by the computer. Partici-
pants were then seated individually in separate booths, where IBM PCs
presented further instructions and experimental materials. Participants
again completed the demographic questions used in Experiment 1, pro-
vided their attitudes about several filler issues, and provided their atti-
tude about the key issue of senior comprehensive exams (measured as in
Experiment 1).
Presentation of Persuasive Messages, Manipulation of Repetition, and Ma-
nipulation of Argument Strength. Participants were then instructed to put
on provided headphones to begin the portion of the experiment involv-
ing simultaneous tasks.4 They were asked to read carefully a randomly
assigned strong or weak version of a message on the computer screen ar-
guing against imposing restrictions on industry to control acid rain. Si-
multaneously, they heard a “background” message presented over the
headphones. Participants were told not to pay attention to the back-
ground message and to concentrate solely on the reading task.
Those in the no–repetition condition heard a background message ar-
guing for an increase in road taxes, whereas those in the repetition con-
dition heard a message arguing for the implementation of senior
comprehensive exams. The strength of the background message was
“matched” to the strength of the written message (i.e., participants ei-
ther heard strong or weak versions of both background and written mes-
sages), and all messages were counter-attitudinal.
Then, to maintain the cover story that the experiment concerned per-
forming simultaneous tasks, participants responded to three statements
presented on successive screens, which assessed their attitudes toward
acid rain on 9–point scales:
The government should impose controls on industry to help minimize
the effect of acid rain in the US.
Increases in problems with acid rain in the US should not be blamed on
the activities of industries operating in affected areas.
The government should require the installation of sulfur dioxide emis-
sions control devices in factories operating in the US.
Manipulation of Personal Relevance. Participants were then informed
that UCSB was undergoing academic re–evaluation and that the school
was seeking recommendations for policy changes. Specifically, compre-
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4. Participants were again directed to put the active channel on their right ear if
left–handed, and vice versa, as in Experiment 1.
hensive exams were being recommended as a requirement for gradua-
tion. Following the often–used methodology of Petty et al. (1981), those
in the high relevance condition were informed that the exams would
start the following year, making this issue personally relevant for them.
In the low relevance condition, the exams would not go into effect for 10
years.
Presentation of Target Message. At this point, participants were in-
structed to read carefully a strong or weak message on the computer
screen arguing for implementation of comprehensive exams. For partic-
ipants in the repetition condition, this message was identical to the com-
prehensive exam message that was played over the headphones in the
previous task. For participants in the no–repetition condition, this was
their first exposure to the comprehensive exam message.
Dependent Measures. Following the comprehensive exam message,
participants responded to several items presented on successive screens
(using 9–point scales). The first three gauged participants’ attitudes
about comprehensive exams by asking their agreement with:
Comprehensive exams will really benefit our university.
UCSB should introduce comprehensive exams as an academic policy.
UCSB should establish a system of comprehensive examinations as a re-
quirement for graduation.
Items designed to check the effectiveness of the manipulations followed.
Three questions assessed the effectiveness of the repetition manipula-
tion by asking about the familiarity of the arguments in the comprehen-
sive exam message. Two questions then assessed the effectiveness of the
manipulation of argument strength, asking how strong and convincing
the arguments were. An additional question assessed the level of per-
sonal relevance felt by the participants about the proposed change in ac-
ademic policies at UCSB. Once finished with these dependent measures,
participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
RESULTS
To ensure that all participants actually read the message about compre-
hensive exams, reading times were recorded and examined. In the dis-
tribution of reading times, we observed two extremely short (outlying)
values. Data from these two individuals were excluded from all analy-
ses, which resulted in a final sample size of 63 (35 male and 28 female)
participants.
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Checks on the Effectiveness of Manipulations
Personal Relevance. The measure of personal relevance was subjected
to a 2 (argument strength) × 2 (repetition) × 2 (relevance) between–sub-
jects ANOVA. Confirming our manipulation, the analysis revealed a
significant main effect of relevance, F(1, 55) = 6.68, p = .012. Those in the
high relevance condition believed the message to be more personally
relevant (M = 7.05) than those in the low relevance condition (M = 5.40).
There was also a main effect of repetition such that people who had
heard the message before found it more relevant (M = 6.88) than those
who had not (M = 5.57), F(1, 55) =4.256, p = .044. Importantly, there was
no interaction between relevance and repetition, F(1, 55) < 1, p = .45.
Those in the repetition condition found the message more personally
relevant in the high (M = 7.95) than the low (M = 5.81) relevance condi-
tion, as did those in the no-repetition condition, M = 6.15 (high) and M
= 4.98 (low). Although the effect of repetition on relevance was unan-
ticipated, its presence does not pose an interpretational problem for
our hypothesis. The higher relevance (which typically increases ana-
lytic processing) reported in the repetition condition works against
rather than for that part of our prediction that claims that repetition
results in reduced analytic processing in the low relevance condition.
Familiarity. The three items about familiarity of the comprehensive
exam message were averaged to form a familiarity index (α = .77). Con-
firming the effectiveness of the manipulation, a 2 (argument strength) ×
2 (repetition) × 2 (relevance) ANOVA revealed a main effect of repeti-
tion, F(1, 55) = 6.829, p = .012. Those people who had heard the compre-
hensive exam message as “background noise” earlier in the experiment
rated it as more familiar (M = 4.81) than those who had instead heard a
message about road taxes (M = 3.55). No other main effects or
interactions were found.
Argument Strength. We averaged the two items used to measure ar-
gument strength (α = .96). Results from the same ANOVA revealed a
main effect of argument strength, F(1, 55) = 29.047, p < .001. As ex-
pected, participants who read the strong version of the message found
its arguments more compelling (M = 5.96) than those who read the
weak version (M = 3.37). Additionally, the analysis revealed a main ef-
fect of relevance on argument strength, F(1, 55) = 4.009, p = .05. Those in
the low relevance condition believed the arguments to be more com-
pelling (M = 5.15) than those in the high relevance condition (M = 4.19).
Importantly, there was no interaction between argument strength and
relevance, F(1, 55) < 1, p = .62. Those in the low relevance condition
found the strong version of the message more compelling (M = 6.32)
than the weak (M = 3.97), as did those in the high relevance condition,
M = 5.60 (strong), M = 2.77 (weak).
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Attitude Change
The three items assessing attitudes about comprehensive exams were
averaged (α = .92). Participants’ initial (pre-message) attitudes about se-
nior comprehensive exams (which confirmed that the pro-comprehen-
sive exam message was counterattitudinal, M = 2.81, on a 9–point scale)
were subtracted from that average to attain a measure of attitude
change. This score was subjected to a 2 (argument strength) × 2 (repeti-
tion) × 2 (relevance) between–subjects ANOVA. Results of the ANOVA
showed two statistically significant effects. First, there was a main effect
of argument strength, F(1, 55) = 50.17, p < .001, showing that the strong
version of the message led to more attitude change (M = 3.25) than the
weak version (M = 0.25).
More importantly, analyses revealed the predicted three–way interac-
tion among argument strength, relevance, and repetition, F(1, 55) =
4.331, p = .042. In the low relevance condition, we expected that those in
the repetition condition would process the message less analytically
than those in the no–repetition condition. This prediction was con-
firmed. A planned contrast within the low relevance condition (contrast
weights: 1, –1, –1, 1) revealed a two–way interaction between argument
strength and repetition, F(1, 55) = 4.97, p = .03. As shown in Figure 2,5
those in the no–repetition condition processed the message analytically,
that is, showed more attitude change in response to strong than weak ar-
guments [planned contrast, F(1, 55) = 24.346, p < .001]; however, those in
the repetition condition did so only marginally [planned contrast, F(1,
55) = 3.628, p = .061].
In the high relevance condition, we expected those in the repetition
condition to process the message more analytically than those in the
no–repetition condition. A planned contrast within the high relevance
condition (contrast weights: 1, –1, –1, 1) failed to reveal a two–way inter-
action between argument strength and repetition, F(1, 55) < .57, p = .46.
As shown in Figure 2, participants in both the no–repetition and repeti-
tion conditions processed the message analytically, that is, they differen-
tiated between strong and weak arguments [planned contrasts: F(1, 55)
= 11.114, p = .001; F(1, 55) = 15.31, p < .001 respectively]. Directionally, the
means followed predictions. The difference between strong and weak
arguments was larger with repetition than without, but this small in-
crease in analytic processing was not sufficient to yield a statistically sig-
nificant interaction, perhaps because of the substantial analytic
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5. It may appear that there is more analytic processing in the low–relevance, no–repeti-
tion condition than the high–relevance, no–repetition condition. Again, however, this is
not the case. There is no interaction between argument strength and relevance in the no–
repetition condition, F(1, 29) = 1.30, p = .264.
processing that already occurred under these circumstances in the
no–repetition condition.
Mediational Analyses
We have suggested that the decrease in analytic processing observed in
the low-relevance conditions is due to familiarity brought on by mes-
sage repetition. In this section, we provide some mediational evidence
that this is the case. In order to show that the effect of repetition on pro-
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FIGURE 2. Experiment 2: Attitude change as a function of relevance, repetition, and
argument strength.
cessing is mediated by familiarity, we obviously need a measure of pro-
cessing and familiarity from each participant. Traditionally, processing
is determined by a between–subjects comparison of those who receive
strong versus weak arguments. Thus, this traditional approach, which
we followed in the current research, does not usually allow for
mediational analyses. However, as stated earlier, we would like to argue
that attitude change following weak arguments could be used as a
within–subject measure of nonanalytic processing. Specifically, the
more participants accept weak arguments, the less analytically they are
processing.
Following the procedures recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986),
we performed a series of regression analyses to demonstrate mediation
of the effect of repetition on attitude change in the low relevance condi-
tion. First, we predicted attitude change from a dummy–coded variable
representing repetition (0 = no repetition, 1 = repetition). Results re-
vealed a significant relationship, b = 1.00, t(16) = 2.41, p = .029, such that
those in the repetition condition were more persuaded by weak argu-
ments than those in the no–repetition condition. Second, we predicted
familiarity from the dummy–coded repetition variable. Results showed
that those in the repetition condition found the arguments more familiar
than those in the no–repetition condition, b = 2.444, t(16) = 3.326, p = .004.
Third, we predicted attitude change from perceived familiarity. Results
indicated that the more familiar the message, the more attitude change
in response to weak arguments, b = .375, t(16) = 4.386, p < .001 Finally, we
predicted attitude change from a model including both the
dummy–coded repetition variable and familiarity. In this analysis, fa-
miliarity continued to predict attitude change, b = .351, t(15) = 3.07, p =
.008. That is, the more familiar the persuasive message seemed, the more
attitude change there was following weak arguments. However, repeti-
tion no longer predicted attitude change, b = .141, t(15) = .322, p = .752.
The reduction in the significance of the relationship between repetition
and attitude change was significant, Sobel = 2.259, p = .024. Taken to-
gether, the results of the mediational analysis show that in low relevance
conditions, it is the perceived familiarity of message arguments, brought
about through message repetition, that is responsible for the reduction
in analytic processing.
In another series of regressions, we investigated familiarity as a poten-
tial mediator of the relationship between repetition and processing in
the high relevance conditions. Specifically, we wanted to assess the role
of familiarity in any increase in analytic processing under these condi-
tions. However, the dummy–coded repetition variable did not predict
attitude change following weak arguments, b = –.764, t(12) = –0.777, p =
.452. In retrospect, this was not terribly surprising because analytic pro-
cessing occurred in both the no–repetition and repetition conditions
328 EFFECTS OF RELEVANCE AND REPETITION ON PROCESSING
when relevance was high in this experiment (i.e., acceptance of weak ar-
guments did not change much with repetition). Thus, because there was
no direct effect of repetition on attitude change in response to weak ar-
guments in the high-relevance condition, we could not investigate
perceived familiarity of the arguments as a possible mediator.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 provided additional confirmation that personal relevance
plays an important role in determining the impact of message repetition
on processing. As expected, when personal relevance was low, message
repetition triggered less processing of the message than it had received
when presented only a single time. This result replicated Gar-
cia–Marques and Mackie’s (2001) findings, and strengthened the reli-
ability of the effect, given that the paradigm used here was not open to
alternative explanations based on processing requirements. Recall that
Garcia–Marques and Mackie’s (2001) participants heard a background
message only in the repetition condition, and thus the reduced process-
ing evidenced in that condition may have resulted from greater fatigue,
wear–out, or distraction. The simultaneous processing task was present
in both the repetition and no–repetition conditions in the current experi-
ment, as those in the no–repetition condition also heard a background
message, yet repetition still yielded the predicted effect. Our replication
of those earlier findings in the low relevance condition suggests that
Garcia–Marques and Mackie’s (2001) use of an only moderately impor-
tant message may have contributed to repetition triggering less process-
ing in that research. The results of the mediational analyses in the low
relevance condition were particularly important theoretically. These re-
sults indicated that the greater the sense of familiarity induced by
repetition, the greater the acceptance of weak arguments (which we
used as an indicator of reduced analytic processing).
Repetition had quite a different effect in the high relevance condition.
When personal relevance was high, participants engaged in analytic
processing regardless of repetition. The strong message was more per-
suasive than the weak, and an additional exposure to the message did
not increase this difference. This result is clearly consistent with our hy-
pothesis that personal relevance plays an important role in determining
the impact of message repetition on processing, although repetition did
not actually increase analytic processing, as found in our Experiment 1
and previous research (Cacioppo & Petty, 1989). As noted, however, this
may be because not much information was likely gleaned during initial
presentation because participants were busy performing another task
and not focused on processing the target message. Therefore, the second
exposure to the message may have been participants’ only real opportu-
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nity to closely scrutinize the message. In addition, because there was a
reasonably large difference between strong and weak arguments in the
no–repetition/high relevance condition, it may have been difficult for
repetition to increase that already large effect.
META–ANALYTIC SUMMARY
A meta–analytic summary was conducted to determine the magnitude
and consistency of the effect sizes representing the predicted three–way
interaction among relevance, repetition and argument quality. A
three–way interaction is captured by a contrast with the following
weights: –1, +1, +1, –1, +1, –1, –1, +1. The numerator of each effect size
was computed by taking the average of the weighted cell means sharing
a +1 weight minus the average of the weighted cell means sharing a –1
weight. This difference was divided by the pooled standard deviations
from those cells, yielding the standardized difference, g. Statistical tests
of the overall effect size and the homogeneity (consistency) of those ef-
fects were based on d, a standardized difference that corrects for sample
size. Calculations were aided by DSTAT, a program designed for
meta–analytic statistics (Johnson, 1989).
The effect sizes representing the three–way interaction were d = .44
(Experiment 1) and d = .37 (Experiment 2). The overall effect size (d = .41)
was statistically different from zero, z = 2.46, p = .01, and the effects were
statistically consistent, Q(1) = 0.039, p = .84. These results confirm the
findings presented with each experiment—that there is a reliable and
consistent interaction among personal relevance, repetition, and
argument strength on persuasion.
Separate meta–analytic summaries were conducted to determine the
magnitude and consistency of the effect sizes of the predicted interaction
between repetition and argument strength within the low and high rele-
vance conditions across the two experiments. The numerator of each ef-
fect size was calculated by taking the average of the weighted strong/no
repetition and the weak/repetition means and subtracting the average
of the weighted weak/no repetition and strong/repetition means, for
each level of relevance separately. Effect sizes in the low relevance con-
dition were d = .233 (Experiment 1) and d = .773 (Experiment 2). The
overall effect size (d = .45) was statistically different from zero, z = 1.967,
p = .049, and the effect sizes were statistically consistent, Q(1) = 1.324, p =
.25. These results confirm that under conditions of low personal rele-
vance, there was a reliable and consistent interaction between repetition
and argument strength across the studies. As displayed in Figures 1 and
2, the pattern of this interaction shows that participants processed the
persuasive message analytically when exposed to the message only
once, but that this effect disappeared when the message was repeated.
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Effect sizes in the high relevance condition were d = –.696 (Experiment
1) and d = –.012 (Experiment 2). The overall effect size (d = –.39) was not
statistically different from zero, z = –1.62, p = .106, and the effect sizes
were statistically consistent, Q(1) = 1.957, p = .16. These results suggest
that the pattern of the interaction between repetition and argument
quality found across the two studies was not reliable. Given the differ-
ences in processing circumstances that occurred in the two studies, how-
ever, it is probably inappropriate to conclude that this effect does not
exist. The substantial increase in analytic processing with repetition
found in Experiment 1 replicated the effect found by Cacioppo and Petty
(1989) when we used a similar methodology. This suggests that repeti-
tion can increase analytic processing when relevance is high, at least
under certain conditions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
These two experiments confirm that personal relevance moderates the
impact of message repetition on processing. Under conditions of low
personal relevance, both experiments found that a familiar message was
processed nonanalytically, replicating the results obtained by Gar-
cia–Marques and Mackie (2001). However, under conditions of high
personal relevance, repetition had a different effect on processing.
Including the two experiments reported by Garcia–Marques and
Mackie (2001), there are now four separate experiments demonstrating
that a sense of familiarity, evoked by message repetition, leads to
nonanalytic processing. As suggested by work predominantly in the
cognitive psychology literature, a match between current inputs and a
memory representation engenders processing fluency, which is experi-
enced as an implicit feeling of familiarity. This implicit sense signals that
the current inputs may be responded to merely on the basis of previ-
ously stored information. Therefore, nonanalytic processing is
appropriate.
These experiments are the first to provide some suggestive
mediational evidence for the regulatory role of familiarity. Regression
analyses on the data from the low relevance condition of Experiment 2
showed that the greater the perceived familiarity of the message, the less
analytic processing performed on it. These analyses further bolster our
contention that the sense of familiarity results in reduced analytic pro-
cessing of repeated messages, regardless of how they were processed on
initial exposure. It is possible, of course, that the target message is pro-
cessed on initial presentation, and that reported attitude scores are the
result of this initial processing plus any processing that occurs during
the repetition exposure. Given the results, this possibility seems only to
lend further support to the hypothesis. Reported attitudes under low
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relevance conditions in both studies reflect a lack of analytic processing
(attitudes in the strong and weak conditions do not differ). This could be
because the first presentation of the message received nonanalytic pro-
cessing and nothing occurred during repetition to change this (i.e., the
repeated message was processed very nonanalytically). Or it could be
because the message was analytically processed on its first presentation,
and then non– analytic processing occurred during the second presenta-
tion, eliminating the argument quality main effect. In either case, the ob-
tained pattern of results could come about only if the repeated message
received nonanalytic processing. Both outcomes seem driven by some
recognition that the message has been encountered before and thus does
not require analytic processing under the circumstances. The regression
analyses are consistent with the idea that it is this recognition that
reduces processing.
Because the methodologies of the current studies were quite differ-
ent, the finding that familiarity leads to nonanalytic processing under
low–relevance conditions appears quite robust and is not likely an ar-
tifact of a particular procedure. The effect was obtained when one or
two repetitions were used to induce a sense of familiarity; when fa-
miliarity was subtle (the message was played as “background noise”)
or blatant (the message played three times with no distraction); when
repetition of the message was anticipated or not; when the target mes-
sage was presented verbally (and processed at participants’ own
pace) or aurally (and not processed at their own pace); and when low
personal relevance was induced by implying that the advocated pro-
gram would affect their university, but not for 10 years, or not affect
their university at all (i.e., would only be used in a high school
psychology experiment).
In addition, the methodologies of these two studies differ in some im-
portant ways from those used by Garcia–Marques and Mackie (2001),
further ruling out specific procedures as confounding variables. For ex-
ample, Garcia–Marques and Mackie used a different target message
(concerning imposing governmental regulations on businesses to con-
trol acid rain) than the current studies. So the fact that message repeti-
tion led to nonanalytic processing is not message specific. Furthermore,
Garcia–Marques and Mackie (Experiment 1) had participants listen to a
message multiple times with a specific (and different) processing goal in
mind (e.g., evaluate the pitch of the speaker’s voice) each time. After the
message was played, participants made judgments relevant to the pro-
cessing goal. Therefore, the multiple repetitions used by Gar-
cia–Marques and Mackie (2001) were spaced, whereas the multiple
repetitions used in Experiment 1 were massed. Thus, the effect that fa-
miliarity leads to nonanalytic processing does not appear to rely on
massed or spaced presentations.
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The current work suggests that the role of familiarity under high rele-
vance conditions may be complex. Message repetition did boost analytic
processing in Experiment 1 but did not do so in Experiment 2. If an in-
crease in analytic processing is caused by additional opportunities to
elaborate on the message content (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979, 1989), then
any one (or a combination) of the methodological differences (discussed
previously) across the two studies could account for the differences in
the results. Clearly, however, our ability to replicate Cacioppo and
Petty’s (1989) results in Experiment 1 demonstrates that under the right
motivational and capacity conditions, the repetition–induced reduction
of analytic processing can be not only eliminated but also reversed.
We have argued that message repetition, to the extent that it induces a
(perhaps implicit) sense of familiarity, triggers nonanalytic processing.
How then might repetition interact with relevance to have the very dif-
ferent impacts on message processing demonstrated in the previous lit-
erature and now in our two studies? We consider two plausible
possibilities. Message repetition (familiarity) may trigger initial
nonanalytic processing regardless of relevance conditions, but its subse-
quent and ultimate impact (like that of many heuristic cues) may be con-
tingent upon relevance (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989). When
participants encounter a repeated message, any resultant sense of famil-
iarity triggers nonanalytic processing. Those in repetition conditions
will thus typically process less analytically (and thus distinguish less be-
tween strong and weak arguments) than those in no–repetition condi-
tions. When relevance is low, participants have no motivation or reason
to further scrutinize the message more thoroughly, and their responses
will parallel the typical case, showing less differentiation between
strong and weak arguments. When personal relevance is high, however,
the nonanalytic processing evoked by familiarity may be augmented or
even supplanted by further analytic processing triggered by higher mo-
tivation. Under these circumstances, message repetition affords addi-
tional opportunities for elaboration. As a result, strong arguments may
result in even greater attitude change, whereas weak arguments may re-
sult in even less change. From this perspective, then, repetition may act
as a nonanalytic processing cue, the outcome of which may be
overwhelmed by the result of other, more extensive processing.
Another possibility is that familiarity leads to nonanalytic processing
regardless of personal relevance, but that the “familiarity thresh-
old”—the number of repetitions necessary to induce a sense of familiar-
ity and trigger nonanalytic processing—differs with relevance. When
relevance is low, even the “gist” of a message may seem “close enough”
to a memory trace, and familiarity may be induced and nonanalytic pro-
cessing triggered. Under conditions of high personal relevance, how-
ever, the familiarity threshold may be raised. A message read under
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high levels of personal relevance will receive careful scrutiny. A detailed
and complex representation of the message is likely generated as a re-
sult. Perhaps a single or even a few additional exposures to that message
may not create a match between the current input and a complex mem-
ory representation. This may in fact occur only after several repetitions.
Thus, nonanalytic processing under high-relevance conditions might be
observed, but only with a larger number of repetitions than used in the
current experiments.
This view provides an interesting alternative interpretation of earlier
relevant work. Although we have already described the “moderate rep-
etition” condition of Cacioppo and Petty’s (1979) study in which partici-
pants heard a pro– or counterattitudinal high–relevance message one or
three times, the study also included a condition in which the message
was heard five times. Their results indicated that with moderate repeti-
tion, agreement with the message increased, but with five repetitions,
agreement declined. Their interpretation was that moderate repetition
allowed for greater analytic processing, whereas excessive repetition led
to tedium, reactance, and/or fatigue. Another possibility, however, is
that with the higher levels of personal relevance and motivation in that
study, higher levels of repetition were necessary before participants
reached a “familiarity threshold” and nonanalytic processing began.
Whether nonanalytic processing induced by numerous repetitions
under high–relevance conditions is the result of tedium or familiarity
can be resolved in future work.
These studies make important contributions in both theoretical and
applied areas. First, they add to the small but growing literature ad-
dressing what factors influence processing–mode selection. The results
suggest that an implicit sense of familiarity, brought about by message
repetition, may trigger nonanalytic processing. Secondly, familiarity
has been shown to lead to nonanalytic processing in numerous other do-
mains, and the current work confirms that it plays a similar role in the
processing of persuasive messages. In addition, this work resolves an
apparent contradiction in the literature. Cacioppo and Petty’s (1989)
work suggested that familiarity increases analytic processing, whereas
Garcia–Marques and Mackie’s (2001) work suggested that familiarity
decreases analytic processing. These two experiments suggest that fa-
miliarity leads to nonanalytic processing under conditions of low per-
sonal relevance but analytic processing under conditions of high
personal relevance. Finally, this work also has substantial applied rele-
vance. Message repetition is common in several domains, such as
advertising and politics. This work suggests conditions under which
that repetition may be more or less effective.
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